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ToRTs-RIGHT OP INFANT To R.EcoVER FOR PRE-NATAL lNJURIBs-Plaintiff's
mother, while pregnant with plaintiff, a viable child, was fatally injured in a
fall from the steps of defendant's bus. Plaintiff was seriously injured by the fall
and was born prematurely. On demurrer to plaintiff's petition, held, plaintiff
had a remedy under the Constitution of Ohio1 for pre-natal injuries negligently
inHicted. Williams v. The Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87

N.E. (2d) 334 (1949).
Generally, the law considers unborn children to be legal persons for purposes
beneficial to them, provided they are subsequently born alive. 2 However, in the

l Ohio Const. (1851), Art. I, §16.
2 Winfield, ''The Unborn Child,"

8 CAMB. L.J. 76 (1942); Drobner v. Peters, 186
N.Y.S. 278, 194 A.D. 696 (1921); Principal case at 336. This was characterized a legal
fiction in Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921); 52 AM. Jun., Torts §98.
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absence of statute, most courts deny an action to infants for negligent pre-natal
injuries.3 The reason usually given is that the child does not exist until birth;
therefore, no duty is owed to a non-existent person. But medical science has
long recognized that embryos have an independent existence from the moment
of conception,4 and property law and criminal law generally regard the child as
a human being at that time. 5 Clearly, denial of an action on the ground that
the unborn child does not exist until birth is unrealistic as well as inconsistent.
Because of this, some recent cases, including the principal case, have held that
an unborn child has a legally protected right to be free from tortious injuries,
but only after the time when it becomes viable. 6 An obvious disadvantage of
this result would seem to be the practical difficulty of determining just when
the change in status from embryo to viable fetus occurs. 7 Nor do these decisions
harmonize the differing theories of tort law, criminal law, and property law concerning when legal rights are imputed to the unborn child, except perhaps by
equating viability to the old concept of "quickening" of the criminal law. 8 However, the viability rule can be explained by granting that the child exists legally
from conception, but at the same time holding that any risk to the child is not
unreasonable until it becomes viable; that no duty to use due care owing to the
child arises until that time. It seems quite probable, in fact, that the ordinary
reasonable man is doubly careful toward a woman who is obviously pregnant.9

3 52 AM. Jc:m., Torts §98; PROSSER, ToRTS 188-190 (1941); 4 TORTS REsTATEMENT
§869 (1939); Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884); Drobner v. Peters, supra,
note 2, 20 A.L.R. 1505 (1921).
4 Bonbrest v. Kotz, (D.C. D.C. 1946) 65 F. Supp. 138 at 140; PATTEN, HuMAN
EMBRYOLOGY 181 (1946); GREISHEIMER, PHYSIOLOGY AND ANATOMY, 5th ed., 738 (1945).
5 Bonbrest v. Kotz, supra, note 4, at 140. See also 27 AM. Jun., Infants §3; Drobner v.
Peters, supra, note 3. But under Texas criminal statutes a child has no independent existence
until birth. See Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W. (2d)
944, 97 A.L.R. 1512 (1935).
6 Bonbrest v. Kotz, supra, note 4; Verkennes v. Comiea, (Minn. 1949) 38 N.W. (2d)
838. "Viable" here means, "capable of living; physically fitted to live; a fetus having reached
a stage of development to permit continued existence, under normal conditions, outside the
womb." Principal case at 117. See also, DoRLAND, AMERICAN ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DrcTIONARY, 20th ed., 1625 (1944). Statutes, however, begin the legal existence of the child
at conception, as in Cooper v. Blanck, (La. 1923, published 1949) 39 S. (2d) 352; and Scott
v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. (2d) 629, 92 P. (2d) 678 (1939), hearing den. 93 P. (2d) 562
(1939).
7 See ANGELES, LEGAL MEDICINE 463-465 (1934); EMERSON, LEGAL MEDICINE AND
ToxrcoLOGY 173-174 (1909). Usually this problem of proof does not face the courts because
the cases are decided on demurrer to the complaint. Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v.
Jordan, supra, note 5, suggests this difficulty as one factor in denying an action to the infant.
8 See Barry, "The Child en Ventre sa Mere," 14 AusT. L.J. 351 (1941).
9 Ordinarily, the pregnancy would be obvious since viability seldom occurs very long
before the seventh month of pregnancy. See ANGELES, LEGAL MEDICINE 464 (1934). But
actual knowledge of the existence of the plaintiff is not essential to fix the defendant with
liability for his negligence. Barry, "The Child en Ventre sa Mere," 14 AusT. L.J. 351 (1941).
Nonetheless, one court thought that the conscious care of a reasonable man is only toward
the pregnant mother. See Magnolia v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, supra, note 5.
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A legal standard requiring this degree of care is neither irrational nor unjust.
Nor is the scope of the "duty" concept so sacrosanct as to preclude this judicial
policy.10 The court in the principal case deals with the problem in terms of the
"right of action" of the infant, but the ultimate inquiry, nonetheless, is whether
the unborn child has an interest which the law will protect; in this situation the
terminology of "duty" or "right of action" merely phrases the conclusion in
different terms. The principal case is decided on the the narrow ground that a
viable child en ventre sa mere is a "person" within the meaning of the Constitution of Ohio which guarantees a remedy for personal injuries to every person.11
However, the existence of the constitutional provision does not distinguish this
case from previous decisions which have reached the opposite result.12 Nor
should the reasoning obscure the important fact that the court is actually deciding that a negligent physical injury to this "person" is a wrong which the law
will recognize.13 The court rejects a reason heavily relied on in earlier decisions,
that difficulty of proof of the cause of pre-natal injury may lead to fraudulent
claims, by suggesting that modem advances in medical science have reduced
the importance of this hazard. 14 Moreover, the law can cope adequately with
uncertainties of proof, as it has in similar instances, through procedural requirements.15 Statutes have aided some courts in reaching the same result as the
principal case,16 but widespread legislative solution to this problem seems unlikely. It is probable that other courts will follow the lead of the principal case
without the aid of statutes.17

Melvin

J.

Spencer, S.Ed.

10 See PROSSER, ToRTs 180 (1941).
11 Ohio Const. (1851) Art. I, §16: "... all courts shall be open and every person, for
an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law.•••"
12cf. Mass. Const. (1780) Art. 11; ill. Const. (1870) Art. 2, §19; N.Y. Civil Rights
Law (McKinney, 1948) §10. See also the Fourteenth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. (1946)
§41.
13 The principal case is the first decision by a court of last resort allowing this action in
the absence of statute.
14 Principal case at 126. It seems unfair to deny plaintiff the opportunity to try to prove
his case because it will be difficult to do so. See Scott v. McPheeters, supra, note 6.
15 See PROSSER, ToRTS 189 (1941); Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227 at 229
(1924).
16 See note 6, supra. See also Montreal Tramways v. LeVeille, (S.Ct. Can., 1933)
4 D.L.R. 337.
17 The Minnesota court reached the same result in an action for wrongful death, even
though the child died undelivered, apparently abrogating the general requirement that the
child be born alive before any rights vest. Verkennes v. Comiea, supra, note 6. This result
is justified under the basic assumption of the viability theory that the infant becomes a human
individual, in fact, before its separation from the mother. Furthermore, many injuries occur
during delivery of the child and it would seem unduly arbitrary to hinge a right of action on
whether the child dies before or after delivery is completed. But cf. 63 HARv. L. REv. 173
(1949).

